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Summary
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The aim of this paper is to examine the economic 
advice that Adam Smith provides for individuals and relate that to the judge‑
ments that he makes about national economies. It argues that Smith’s interest in 
unintended consequences leads him to consider both levels of economic activity 
in a particular way. While these aspects of his thought have been discussed in 
the literature, they have not been analysed together.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: As a book the Wealth 
of Nations had two interrelated purposes: it was a scientific attempt to understand 
political economy, and it was also a critical intervention into British policy based 
upon the evidence of that inquiry. This paper looks at the connection between 
these two aspects of the book. In particular it examines how Smith moves from 
an explanation of the evolution and operation of commercial society that de‑
pends on unintended consequences (such as the famous ‘invisible hand’) to a set 
of suggestions for macro level policy to be undertaken by the government and 
micro level advice for individuals. The paper proceeds by close textual analysis 
of key passages from Smith’s work. 
THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: the paper traces how Smith’s 
scientific approach generalises from historical evidence to identify and study 
the core principles of the division of labour and trade. From here he identifies 
a set of necessary conditions for the successful operation of a commercial society: 
The rule of law, political stability, and certain public works and regulations. 
S u g g e s t e d  c i t a t i o n: Smith, C. (2017). The Scottish Enlightenment 
and the Challenges of Commercial Society: Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. 
Horizons of Politics, 8(25), 43 ‑64. DOI: 10.17399/HP.2017.082503.
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But Smith also offers some observations on successful economic strategies that 
should be adopted by individuals.
RESEARCH RESULTS: The paper shows that Smith communicates his advice 
to individuals through character sketches of the book’s ‘hero’ the prudent man, 
and the book’s ‘villains’ the prodigal and the projector. The contrast between 
these examples serves a didactic purpose for Smith. 
CONCLUSION, INNOVATION AND RECOMMENDATION: The pa‑
per concludes by taking a look at Smith’s advice to individuals for pursuing 
economic success through character sketches. It contributes to the literature 
by stressing Smith’s interest in the connection between macro‑level national 
economic phenomena and micro‑level individual economic strategy, and by 
showing how his book offers advice to both nations and individuals. This is an 
underexplored dimension of Smith’s account that is examined in detail in a way 
not present in the scholarly literature. 
Keywords:
Adam Smith, Commercial Society, prudence, unintended 
consequences
INTRODUCTION
When Adam Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776 it seems that 
he had two distinct, but related, objects in mind. The first of these was 
to provide a systematic survey of the political economy of commercial 
societies that would place the study of the economy on a secure and 
scientific basis. The second purpose was to use this systematic enquiry 
and its conclusions to contribute to the debates about British economic 
policy. Smith famously described this as “a very violent attack…upon 
the whole commercial system of Great Britain” (Smith, 1987, p. 251). 
My aim in this paper is to examine how one of the key theoretical 
developments of Smith’s intellectual enquiry impacts on the advice 
that he gives. What I have in mind here is not so much Smith’s actual 
policy interventions through direct advice given to politicians, nor is 
it his general prescription for the role of the government as detailed in 
Book V of the Wealth of Nations. 1 These I take to fall broadly under the 
1   For discussions of Smith’s impact on policy making see Bonnyman, 2014; 
Phillipson, 2010; Stigler, 1971.
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heading offered by Tom Campbell of “Contemplative Utilitarianism” 
(Campbell & Ross, 1981), practical, pragmatic, and evidence based 
policies that a government can enact to assist economic development. 
Instead I want to look at how Smith’s adoption of a general theoretical 
outlook that stresses unintended consequences impacts on his ideas 
with particular reference to what he says about the behaviour of indi‑
viduals in a commercial society. This approach reveals how Smith’s 
character sketches of the virtues, usually discussed in the literature on 
his moral philosophy (Hanley, 2009), form part of the advice on effec‑
tive economic behaviour found in his political economy. 
 In order to do this I want to suggest that Smith’s approach is to divide 
his policy advice into two levels: a macro level and a micro level. On 
the macro level the adoption of an unintended consequence approach 
leads Smith to favour minimal direct economic planning in the place 
of a secure system of property rights backed by a state that provides 
key non‑market provided goods. But for the purposes of the current 
essay I want to focus on the micro level. In the existing literature there 
is a tendency to view the micro level through the macro level. One clear 
example of this can be found in discussion of the famous idea of the 
invisible hand where this particular sub set of unintended consequences 
explanations tends to ignore the purposiveness of the actors involved. 
As a result this essay will adopt an analytic approach, attempting prop‑
erly to reconstruct Smith’s micro level discussion to determine the place 
of purposive individual behaviour within an unintended consequences 
macro analysis. My aim then is to examine how Smith’s adoption of 
unintended consequences explanations impacts on the advice he gives 
to individuals on how they ought to conduct their economic activities 
(even if they cannot predict the unintended consequences of their cho‑
sen actions). In other words my focus is on the individual level actions 
that come together to form the unintended consequences that Smith 
sees as characteristic of social change in a commercial society. 2 It is the 
advice that he develops on this level that is one of the most overlooked 
parts of Smith’s advice for eighteenth century Britain.
 In order to explore this underappreciated aspect of Smith’s thought 
I will provide an analytical account of its place and operation within 
2   In this sense the paper will contribute to the debate surrounding the nature 
of the invisible hand (Otteson, 2002; Smith, 2006).
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his thinking. 3 Let’s clear the ground with a couple of preliminary ob‑
servations. The first concerns Smith’s methodology. Smith’s approach 
is scientific in the sense that its theoretical observations are generali‑
sations drawn from evidence. The book abounds with examples and 
data, case studies and historical observations. Smith’s desired aim 
was to systematise our thinking about the economy. But the desire 
to systematise is conducted with an appropriate degree of sceptical 
caution and with one eye always on the evidence. 
 Economic thinking, as he observes in the introduction, has given rise 
to a number of different systems of thought which have in turn sought 
to account for the development of the economy to its present condition. 
But here, right at the start of the book, Smith makes a clear distinction 
between the act of systematic analysis and the motivations of the actors 
whose unintended consequences have produced the object of study. 
This observation, of a distinction between the motivations and reason‑
ing of actors involved in actual economic activity and the motivations 
and reasoning of the detached philosophers observing the system as 
a whole, becomes central to Smith’s thinking about political economy.
 Perhaps the clearest statement of the limitations that this puts on 
policy comes in his own admission that his desired policy of free 
trade is unlikely ever to be enacted.
To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely 
restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or 
Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of 
the publick, but what is more unconquerable, the private interests 
of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it (Smith, 1976a, p. 471). 
Smith clearly believed that he had provided a convincing argument 
against mercantilist policy, but at the same time he accepted the po‑
litical and economic reality that the system which he advocated in its 
place was unlikely ever to be realised in full. For the purposes of our 
discussion here it is worth noting that it is the private interests of 
individuals that oppose it. This points us to the topic that I want to 
3   This analytic account will make the case for the centrality of this to Smith’s 
overall account of commercial society, understanding, of course, that 
Smith’s project is undertaken in the particular context of eighteenth century 
political economy (Hont, 2005; Rutherford, 2012; Berry, 2015). 
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explore: what did Smith think individuals should do in a commercial 
economy? How should they direct their behaviour?
 The importance of this issue is underlined by Smith’s understand‑
ing of the nature of the wealth of a nation. Smith’s definition of what 
the state should seek for the national economy is essentially the same 
as that which he attributes to the individual: “But the great object of 
the political oeconomy of every country, is to increase the riches and 
power of that country” (Smith, 1976a, p. 372).
 But what we must also bear in mind is that Smith has a particular 
understanding of what such wealth and power is. It is an aggregate 
of the wealth and power of the individuals within a society. Smith’s 
defence of commercial society is based on the idea that the living 
standards of the great bulk of the population are rising in an advanc‑
ing economy, “scanty” (Smith, 1976a, p. 91) in a static economy, and 
precarious in a declining or shrinking economy. 4 The power that 
comes from wealth is “the power of purchasing; a certain command 
over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in 
the market” (Smith, 1976a, p. 48). The wealth of a nation is the wealth 
of its people taken as a whole: their ability to acquire the “necessities 
and conveniencies” (Smith, 1976b, p. 231) of life. It is this that allows 
Smith to differentiate between the public interest and the specific 
interests of merchants who are able to persuade the government that 
their own interests are the interests of the people through arguments 
about the balance of trade. Smith’s point being, of course, that the 
interests of this specific group are almost always at odds with the 
interests of society as a whole (Smith, 1976a, p. 264‑267). 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND FEUDALISM
Unintended consequences are at the heart of Smith’s analysis in the 
Wealth of Nations. From the very start he deploys the concept to ac‑
count for his central principle of the division of labour: 
4   Compare with: “The progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the he‑
arty state to all the different orders of society. The stationary is dull; the 
declining, melancholy” (Smith, 1976a, p. 99). This leads Smith to observe: 
“It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase, 
which occasions a rise in the wages of labour” (Smith, 1976a, p. 87).
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The division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, 
is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and 
intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the 
necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain 
propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive 
utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another (Smith, 1976a, p. 25).
The classic case study of social change in the Wealth of Nations is the 
decline of feudalism and the rise of commercial society. 5 Smith’s 
central discussion of this process dwells on the unintended conse‑
quences of the interaction of two groups, lords and merchants, who 
each have their own self‑regarding objectives, but whose interaction 
issues in a macro level social change that neither intended. In his 
classic statement:
A revolution of the greatest importance to the publick happiness, was 
in this manner brought about by two different orders of people, who 
had not the least intention to serve the publick. To gratify the most 
childish vanity was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The mer‑
chants and artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely from a view 
to their own interest, and in pursuit of their own pedlar principle of 
turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got. Neither of them 
had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution which the 
folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing 
about (Smith, 1976a, p. 422).
If large scale social change is not the result of deliberate policy, but 
rather can be retrospectively identified as a pattern emerging from 
individual behaviour, then we see what Christopher Berry has aptly 
described as Smith’s “demotion of purposive rationality” (Berry, 
1997, p. 39) in historical explanation. Both the lords and the merchants 
have a conception of their own interest, and the interaction of them 
in its pursuit leads to a socially beneficial outcome neither intended. 
In a moment we will outline the political lessons that Smith draws 
from this, but our interest here lies with the advice that Smith pro‑
vides for individuals. 
5   Smith offers a parallel analysis of the rise and fall of slavery (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 99, 390).
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 Viewed from this perspective Smith is suggesting that the lords 
and the merchants have a conception of their own interest and they 
respond to it. In pursuing what they believe to be their interest in the 
most effective way apparent to them they create social patterns which 
in one sense reflect the mutual satisfaction of interest – the lords get 
the goods, the merchants turn a profit. Mutual satisfaction through 
exchange if focussed on the particular exchange, it is not motivated 
by a desire to maximise a macro level social output: nonetheless that 
is what arises as an unintended consequence.
 Smith offers a similar model in his discussion of the incentives 
offered by differential wages:
If in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently 
either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would 
crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, 
that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employ‑
ments. This at least would be the case in a society where things were 
left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and 
where every man was perfectly free both to chuse what occupation 
he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper. 
Every man’s interest would prompt him to seek the advantageous, 
and to shun the disadvantageous employments (Smith, 1976a, p. 116).
The basic observation that individuals will pursue what they believe 
to be their own advantage in both of these examples assumes that the 
exchanges take place within a framework of rules. Successful mutual 
exchange depends upon other options, such as theft or expropriation, 
being ruled out. Not only must the merchant be assured of retaining 
his profit, but he must also be assured of punishment if, instead of 
turning a penny, he decides to pick a pocket. Likewise the lord must 
be prevented from exercising force in extracting the good from the 
merchant, an opportunity that the dissipation of wealth in Smith’s 
account of the fall of feudalism assures.
 At the root of Smith’s argument in favour of allowing the free 
interaction of individuals in this sort of exchange is an epistemic 
argument: 
But the law ought always to trust people with the care of their own 
interest, as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge 
better of it than the legislator can do (Smith, 1976a, p. 531). 
50
Craig Smith 
 Individuals are best placed to know both their own interest and 
the most effectual way to realise it in their own specific circumstances. 
As a result of this Smith’s micro level advice to individuals will take 
the form of general suggestions about types of behaviour.
DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN
In Book V of the Wealth of Nations Smith famously states what he takes 
to be the three main roles of the government: defence, administration 
of justice, and the provision of certain public works that would not 
be provided by the market (Smith, 1976a, p. 687‑688).
 As Gavin Kennedy has pointed out the scope for government ac‑
tion that Smith allows under the third heading is far wider than often 
assumed by some of his more laissez faire contemporary admirers. 6 
Smith clearly envisages a role for the government in economic activity 
beyond defence and property rights. However, as Charles Griswold 
(1999, p. 295) and Samuel Fleischacker (2003, p. 236) have noted, 
6   Kennedy (2008, p. 182‑183) lists 27 examples in WN which debunk the view 
that Smith held a dogmatic ‘laissez‑faire’ view that was always opposed to 
state action. These include: the Navigation Acts, blessed by Smith under 
the assertion that “defence, however, is of much more importance than 
opulence” (Smith, 1976a, p. 464); Sterling marks on plate and stamps on 
linen and woollen cloth (Smith, 1976a, p. 138‑139); enforcement of contracts 
by a system of justice (Smith, 1976a, p. 720); regulations of paper money in 
banking (Smith, 1976a, p. 437); obligations to build party walls to prevent 
the spread of fire (Smith, 1976a, p. 324); erecting and maintaining certain 
public works and public institutions intended to facilitate commerce (roads, 
bridges, canals and harbours) (Smith, 1976a, p. 723); coinage and the mint 
(Smith, 1976a, p. 478); post office (Smith, 1976a, p. 724); regulation of insti‑
tutions, such as company structures (joint‑ stock companies, co‑partneries, 
regulated companies and so on) (Smith, 1976a, p. 731‑758); temporary mo‑
nopolies, including copyright and patents, of fixed duration (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 754); education of youth (village schools, curriculum design and so on) 
(Smith, 1976a, p. 758‑789); education of people of all ages (tythes or land 
tax) (Smith, 1976a, p. 788); the prevention of “leprosy or any other loathso‑
me and offensive disease” from spreading among the population (Smith, 
1976a, p. 787‑788); registration of mortgages for land, houses and boats over 
two tons (Smith, 1976a, p. 861, 863); government restrictions on interest for 
borrowing (Smith, 1976a, p. 356‑357); laws against banks issuing low‑de‑
nomination promissory notes (Smith, 1976a, p. 324); and moderate export 
taxes on wool exports for government revenue (Smith, 1976a, p. 879).
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this role is pragmatic and based on the likely success of each policy 
intervention. A point which reminds us that Smith has no settled rule 
which determines where and when a government should act. What 
he does have, however, is a clear idea of what is essential for govern‑
ment to provide and where government action is unlikely to succeed.
 Smith’s analysis of “the progress of improvement” (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 253) emphasises that it is the provision of a stable legal order that 
is the key to the development of a commercial society. A stable legal 
system is one of the consequences of the fall of feudalism. The rule of 
law evolved through a historical process of unintended consequences 
in Britain. 7
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state 
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which 
the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their 
property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and 
in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly 
employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are 
able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flo‑
urish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence 
in the justice of government (Smith, 1976a, p. 910).
The reason for this is straightforward in Smith’s view: without se‑
curity individuals have no incentive to labour. But more than this, 
security allows the space for a natural propensity to reveal itself. In re‑
sponse to the incentives of security individuals will exert themselves 
to improve their situation. Smith identifies a number of measures of 
the outcome of this process. Two of these are of particular interest 
and are intimately related in Smith’s view. Population (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 87‑88) and the wages of labour (Smith, 1976a, p. 99) are taken as 
proxies for rising living standards achieved by the successful pursuit 
of interest by individuals.
 The dynamic here is interesting. Smith is arguing that we want 
to improve our situation and that we do so through the rewards of 
7   “…but above all, that equal and impartial administration of justice which 
renders the rights of the meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, 
and which, by securing to every man the fruits of his own industry, gives 
the greatest and most effectual encouragement to every sort of industry” 
(Smith, 1976a, p. 610).
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labour which in turn act as an incentive to further labour. The ob‑
servation that this leads to a larger population might on one level 
be thought to be an unintended consequence of this process. But 
in reality Smith sees it as part of the incentive process. We want to 
provide for ourselves, and for our families, and to the extent that we 
can care for our children and improve their lives to a greater extent 
if we have more resources, then we have an incentive to pursue our 
interest in the most effective fashion possible. This in turn extends the 
population and means that it keeps pace with the level of economic 
development.
 It’s worth noting that Smith’s example for this phenomenon is 
a comparison between Europe and China. While, as Malthus would 
later point out, it would be problematic for a society were its popu‑
lation to outstrip the level of resources available to feed it, Smith 
seems instead to view a growing population as morally desirable in 
itself. This is not because of any brute value in having more people, 
but rather because it is the result of lower infant mortality. Again 
the macro outcome is not part of the intention of the actors – I’m not 
working hard to reduce infant mortality in my nation, I’m working 
hard to feed my family. 8 
INDIVIDUAL DESIRE TO IMPROVE
So Smith has identified a set of general conditions that create the 
space for individuals to increase industry. He has also identified 
a powerful incentive and indicator of this in population growth and 
rising living standards. But as our focus is on the micro level here we 
should delve a little more deeply into what Smith has to say about 
the motivation of individuals in this situation. The key is the identi‑
fication of a natural propensity: the desire to better our condition. 9
8   It is worth noting that it is this sort of self‑interest that Smith’s believes will 
be approved by all impartial spectators in TMS. A man who neglected his 
own children in favour of trying to save the children of others would be held 
in contempt.
9   In TMS he talks about admiring the rich and the origin of ambition and 
ranks as potentially the greatest source of moral corruption using exactly 
the same term: “that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our 
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 Smith offers three broad definitions of this individual motivation:
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, 
when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so power‑
ful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only 
capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of 
surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the 
folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations… (Smith, 
1976a, p. 540).
The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better 
his condition, the principle from which publick and national, as well 
as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful eno‑
ugh to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, 
in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest 
errors of administration (Smith, 1976a, p. 343).
But the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our 
condition, a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, 
comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into 
the grave. In the whole interval which separates those two moments, 
there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any man is so perfec‑
tly and completely satisfied with his situation, as to be without any 
wish of alteration or improvement, of any kind. An augmentation of 
fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and 
wish to better their condition (Smith, 1976a, p. 341).
The first two of these appear in anti‑mercantilist passages where he 
criticises policies which seek to promote industry but end up having 
the unintended consequence of misdirecting effort and favouring 
sectional interests rather than the public interest. 10 Even in the face of 
obstacles the desire to improve our situation drives industry forward 
to overcome barriers. In conditions of legal security all individuals 
will attempt to improve their situation. What’s interesting from our 
point of view is that in the third passage above Smith makes an ex‑
plicit link between the desire to improve and the urge to save. 
condition” (Smith, 1976b, p. 50). For Smith’s concept of improvement see the 
passage in TMS where he discusses infanticide (Smith, 1976b, p. 209‑210).
10   Again Smith’s criticism of the merchant’s “mean rapacity” and “monopo‑
lizing spirit” (Smith, 1976a, p. 493) accepts that these features cannot be 
completely removed, though they can be checked.
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 This passage is interesting because it contrasts two distinct strate‑
gies that people might deploy: to spend in order to secure present 
enjoyment, and to save and invest for future enjoyment. Saving, on 
a crude level, is only possible under a situation of security, but more 
significantly Smith regards it as the most obvious strategy to develop 
on an individual level.
It is the means the most vulgar and the most obvious; and the most 
likely way of augmenting their fortune, is to save and accumulate 
some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or 
upon some extraordinary occasions. Though the principle of expence, 
therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some occasions, and in 
some men upon almost all occasions, yet in the greater part of men, 
taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle of 
frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very 
greatly (Smith, 1976a, p. 341‑342).
This is an interesting observation because in both the fall of feudalism 
passage above and its counterpart in TMS Smith suggests that it is 
expenditure in pursuit of the trappings of wealth that drives indus‑
try. The feudal lords lose power because, like Esau, they sell their 
birthright for a mess of potage. We pursue wealth not for its utility 
but for its capacity to make others admire us. For example in the al‑
legory of the poor man’s son “whom heaven in its anger has visited 
with ambition” (Smith, 1976b, p. 181). Smith shows how a desire 
to enjoy the supposed benefits of the life of the rich leads a young 
man to hard labour and obsessive work without enjoying life and 
at the end, when he grows old, he finds that he was deceived. That 
the goods his wealth has bought him do not make him any happier. 
Smith refers to this as the “deception…which rouses and keeps in 
continual motion the industry of mankind” (Smith, 1976b, p. 183).
 In the unintended consequences model the poor man’s son might 
be considered a hero, because his labour serves the interest of others 
and boosts productivity for both himself and society. However the 
tone of Smith’s description is not laudatory; rather it is tragic. As 
with his contempt for the frivolous lords, Smith seems to be sug‑
gesting that the macro benefit of economic growth is bought at the 
price of a wasted life. Passages like this have led some to read Smith 
as a Stoic, arguing for a more ascetic notion of virtue than is often 
believed. Take, for example, the following passage from TMS: 
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What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who 
is out of debt, and has a clear conscience? To one in this situation, all 
accessions of fortune may properly be said to be superfluous; and if 
he is much elevated upon account of them, it must be the effect of the 
most frivolous levity (Smith, 1976b, p. 45).
One reading of this passage is that it suggests that real happiness 
does not arise from the possession of wealth. If we have enough to 
be going along with then any gain is strictly speaking unnecessary. 
However, this seems hard to square with the passages on the desire 
to improve our situation. The Stoic rises above his desires by denying 
that they affect his happiness. But if that were true what becomes of 
the natural desire to better our condition?
 One way of squaring the circle is to distinguish between the de‑
sire for wealth incentivised by a desire for display and admiration, 
and a desire for wealth to improve our material circumstances. That 
Smith has something like this distinction in mind can be seen in his 
discussion of the characters of the prodigal and the prudent man. 
Here he distinguishes between precisely these two motivations:
The desire of becoming the proper objects of this respect, of de‑
serving and obtaining this credit and rank among our equals, is, 
perhaps, the strongest of all our desires, and our anxiety to obtain 
the advantages of fortune is accordingly much more excited and 
irritated by this desire, than by that of supplying all the necessities 
and conveniencies of the body, which are always very easily sup‑
plied (Smith, 1976b, p. 213). 
PRODIGALS
Throughout his work Smith cites a number of character sketches 
which, like that of the poor man’s son, illustrate particular ways in 
which the desire to better our condition might be pursued. For ex‑
ample, Smith criticises the miser as having a faulty notion of value. 
Seeing the hoarding and accumulation of wealth as the end of human 
life is, Smith suggests, misguided and distinct from the motivation 
of a man of “exact oeconomy and assiduity” (Smith, 1976b, p. 173). 
Elsewhere he contrasts two alternative character types: the prodigal 
and the prudent man. The prodigal has his attention focussed on the 
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short term enjoyment of wealth, while the prudent man is careful with 
his resources and looks to secure and slowly advance his condition. 
 One way of viewing this is to take the position we discussed ear‑
lier of the macro level outcomes. By this approach we could see the 
prodigal as akin to the feudal lord whose extravagance unwittingly 
provides a living for the industrious and changes society’s power 
balance. But this is not the point that Smith wants to make. His discus‑
sion of the prodigal refers to behaviour within an already commercial 
society.
The prodigal perverts it in this manner. By not confining his expence 
within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who 
perverts the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, 
he pays the wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality 
of his forefathers had, as it were, consecrated to the maintenance of 
industry. By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of 
productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends on 
him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the subject 
on which it is bestowed, and, consequently, the value of the annual 
produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth 
and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some was not com‑
pensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by 
feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious, tends not only to 
beggar himself, but to impoverish his country (Smith, 1976a, p. 339).
From this point of view “every prodigal appears to be a publick 
enemy, and every frugal man a publick benefactor” (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 340). This might lead us to believe that Smith would then explore 
policies that sought to discourage prodigal behaviour. But he doesn’t 
pursue this. Instead he takes the view that over the whole of society 
the prudent outweigh the prodigal, and that in a commercial setting 
the prodigal in reality harms himself more than others.
It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great na‑
tion can be much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of 
individuals; the profusion or imprudence of some is always more 
than compensated by the frugality and good conduct of others (Smith, 
1976a, p. 341).
So a prodigal may be admonished on the grounds of his personal 
behaviour, but is not to be regarded as a danger to national wealth. 
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A point that Smith returns to when he suggests that government is 
often the most prodigal part of the nation. 
hey are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest 
spendthrifts in society. Let them look well after their own expence, 
and they may safely trust private people with theirs (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 346).
Now as we saw above the desire to better our condition is strong 
enough to overcome both the restrictions of merchants and the 
prodigality of governments. For Smith “publick prodigality and 
misconduct” (Smith, 1976a, p. 342) and “the publick extravagance 
of government” (Smith, 1976a, p. 343) are inevitable, but like private 
prodigality need not concern us too much so long as the efforts of 
the prudent majority are allowed to unfold. Smith makes this point 
explicitly when he discusses taxation in Book V:
Under the system of funding, the frugality and industry of priva‑
te people can more easily repair the breaches which the waste and 
extravagance of government may occasionally make in the general 
capital of the society (Smith, 1976a, p. 925).
THE PRUDENT MAN
Smith’s discussion of the prodigal and the prudent man form part 
of his analysis of capital. Investment comes from capital, and capital 
comes from savings.
Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, 
and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number 
of productive hands, or enables some other person to do so. As the 
capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from 
his annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society, 
which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, 
can be increased only in the same manner.
 Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the incre‑
ase of capital. Industry, indeed provides the subject which parsimony 
accumulates. But whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did 
not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater.
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 Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the ma‑
intenance of productive hands, tends to increase the number of those 
hands whose labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it is 
bestowed. It tends therefore to increase the exchangeable value of the 
annual produce of the land and labour of the country (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 337). 11
Parsimony and careful investment are strategies which are motivated 
by the desire of improving our situation. As we noted above they 
are the most frequently chosen strategy, as the prudent outnumber 
the prodigal. 12 As individuals we have an interest in protecting our 
capital and investing it productively. This in turn leads to the gradual 
accumulation of capital on the aggregate level of the nation. 
 In TMS Smith provides us with a more fully realised character 
sketch of the prudent man. Here prudence is depicted as the virtue 
of the middle classes: a virtue which is solid, but not heroic; neces‑
sary for a happy life, but not sufficient for a great life. Nonetheless 
Smith underlines that it is a virtue which is always approved of by 
our conscience.
the prudent man is always both supported and rewarded by the entire 
approbation of the impartial spectator, and of the representative of the 
impartial spectator, the man within the breast (Smith, 1976b, p. 215).
However much we approve of the virtue of prudence our admiration 
of it is a “cold esteem” (Smith, 1976b, p. 216) which does not rise to 
ardent admiration. Smith goes on to discuss the various levels of 
disapproval that we level at imprudence arising from foolishness, 
prodigality, and dishonesty. The point here seems to be that, like 
justice, we come to expect individuals to behave in a prudent fashion. 
11   “By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to 
an additional number of productive hands, for that or the ensuing year, but, 
like the founder of a publick workhouse, he establishes as it were a perpetual 
fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come” (Smith, 
1976a, p. 338). 
12   Parsimony is not directed or proscribed by law, instead: “It is always guar‑
ded…by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every 
individual to whom any share of it shall ever belong” (Smith, 1976a, p. 338).
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It is, if you like, the baseline for social life. 13 Just as following the 
rules of justice is necessary for society to exist, and for us to create 
the space for improving our situation, so prudence is the baseline 
necessary among the population in order for society to continue 
in an advancing state or as Ryan Hanley puts it “Prudence is thus 
insufficient unto itself, though it constitutes a necessary point of 
departure for the development of a more complete ethical system” 
(Hanley, 2009, p. 130). 
 Smith’s sketch of the prudent man dwells on his desire to be good 
at his job, to be respected by his peers for his skill, his modesty, and 
his reticence at becoming involved in politics or the affairs of others. 
The prudent man knows his own business and is not “a bustler in the 
affairs of others” (Smith, 1976b, p. 215). The key to the prudent man’s 
approach is cautious investment with security as the first concern: 
It is rather cautious than enterprising, and more anxious to preserve 
the advantages which we already possess, than forward to prompt us 
to the acquisition of still greater advantages. The methods of impro‑
ving our fortune, which it principally recommends to us, are those 
which expose to no loss or hazard; real knowledge and skill in our 
trade or profession, assiduity and industry in the exercise of it, fruga‑
lity, and even some degree of parsimony, in all our expenses (Smith, 
1976b, p. 213).
Of course this is not to say that the prudent man is entirely risk averse. 
He is simply unwilling to risk losing what he has for uncertain gain 
[however large]. The prudent man can thus be seen to exercise self‑
command over both the desire to better his condition and the desire 
to acquire the approval of society.
He has no anxiety to change so comfortable a situation, and does not 
go in quest of new enterprises and adventures, which might endanger, 
but could not well increase, the secure tranquillity which he actually 
enjoys. If he enters into any new projects or enterprises, they are likely 
to be well concerted and well prepared. He can never be hurried or 
drove into them by any necessity, but has always time and leisure to 
deliberate soberly and coolly concerning what are likely to be their 
consequences (Smith, 1976b, p. 215).
13   See Berry, 2013, p. 141.
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So Smith seems to be suggesting that prudence predominates over 
prodigality in society and that this is reflected in the disapproval of 
prodigals and the universal cool regard for the prudent. We do not 
hail the prudent as great men as it is the virtue that we expect from 
all men. Indeed Smith links this attitude to the shame felt at bank‑
ruptcy which he argues is the ‘most humiliating calamity’ (Smith, 
1976a, p. 342).
EXAMPLES OF PRUDENCE: BANKS
One concrete manifestation of the importance of Smith’s emphasis 
on prudence is his discussion of banking. Smith’s experience of the 
developing Scottish banking system led him to recognise the cen‑
trality of making the savings of prudent individuals available for 
investment in improving enterprises. Paper money as developed by 
the Scottish Banks allowed for the circulation of capital. The prob‑
lem, as with the Ayr Bank, was that intemperate lending threatened 
to dissipate capital and thus reduce the long term progress of the 
economy. He asks us to imagine the difference between the lending 
strategy of a private person and a bank. If I am to lend you some of 
my hard won capital then I will only do so if I am certain of your 
good character and of the likely success of your plan. So 
frugal debtors of private persons, on the contrary, would be more 
likely to employ the money borrowed in sober undertakings which 
were proportioned to their capitals, and which, though they might 
have less of the grand and the marvellous, would have more of the 
solid and the profitable… (Smith, 1976a, p. 317).
This is then contrasted with banks who lend to those unknown to 
them. These are likely to attract “chimerical projectors” (Smith, 1976a, 
p. 317) whose grand plans will be less well considered and less practi‑
cally achievable than the more modest plans of improvement of per‑
sonal debtors. It’s important to note that this is not an observation that 
depends on the scale of the debt for Smith. The point is rather about 
the nature of the knowledge and the relationship between lender and 
debtor. One type of relationship encourages prudent projects and 
prudent lending, the other encourages careless speculation. Smith’s 
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advice on banking is that it should be undertaken and structured 
in as prudent a fashion as possible. The policy advice that follows 
involves legal regulations, such as that on the rate of interest and 
the exclusion of small notes, which he compares to the regulations 
mandating fire walls (Smith, 1976a, p. 324), as a violation of natural 
liberty, but one which can be justified on pragmatic grounds. But the 
recommendations also involve allowing failing banks to fail. Part of 
the argument here is that this creates a moral hazard situation, where 
prudent behaviour is encouraged by the failure of imprudent lend‑
ers. Smith seems to feel that this advice needs further defence and 
elaboration and he provides this with a passage which argues that 
the disruption caused by such event would be short‑lived and less 
dramatic than imagined (Smith, 1976a, p. 314‑316). Indeed the point 
he makes here seems to parallel the point that we have seen above 
about the resilience of an economy dominated by the prudent in the 
face of the intemperance of prodigals and the misguided policy of 
mercantilists. The parallel is made explicit:
Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, 
fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to dimi‑
nish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. 
In every such project, though the capital is consumed by productive 
hands only, yet, as by the injudicious manner in which they are em‑
ployed, they do not reproduce the full value of their compensation, 
there must always be some diminution in what would otherwise have 
been the productive funds of society (Smith, 1976a, p. 341).
That having been said, the economy is able to draw on the careful 
behaviour of the prudent slowly, cautiously, acting to improve their 
own situation in the best way they know how. If this holds then, as 
Smith argues, we can be content that good investments will outweigh 
bad investments. 
 Exactly the same argument is employed when Smith comes to 
discuss what form of company organisation he prefers. Again the 
stress is on ensuring a sense of personal responsibility and prudence. 
Smith expresses a clear preference for partnerships above joint stock 
companies. His argument is straightforward enough: 
being managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
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anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over theres (Smith, 1976a, p. 741). 
In other words, joint stock companies do not ensure prudent 
behaviour.
 To further underline the point we have been making here we can 
return to our initial interest: the connection between macro level 
unintended consequences analyses and micro level individual beha‑
viour. In the famous invisible hand passage in the Wealth of Nations 
the entire analysis turns on the macro outcomes of prudent individual 
investment. Careful investors, according to Smith, invest close to 
home. This is not because of national pride or benevolence, but from 
a desire for security. The unintended consequence of this careful 
investment is the support of domestic industry in a manner more ef‑
ficient than political attempts to do so. The invisible hand metaphor 
is used here to illustrate how prudent behaviour by individuals can 
produce macro level beneficial unintended consequences:
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the socie‑
ty more effectually than when he really intends to promote it (Smith, 
1976a, p. 456). 14
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
Let us be quite clear about what Smith is arguing here. He is not 
being naively optimistic when he says that economic development 
will continue regardless. He has an argument about why that is the 
case. It is because most people, most of the time, act in a prudent 
fashion. Provide a stable legal and political system and they will use 
their local knowledge to trade with others and slowly improve their 
situations. That some people do not, that some are bold projectors, 
or intemperate lenders, or prodigals, or spendthrift governments, 
or partial mercantilists, will in the long run make little difference. 
His argument is an optimistic one: that the system of a commercial 
14   In Smith, 2006 I make the case for reading invisible and arguments as one 
sub set of the broader category of unintended consequences explanations.
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society is robust enough to bounce back from the crises that arise 
from imprudence.
 Moreover, by understanding this aspect of Smith’s work we can 
see how he is able to offer advice to individuals on how to adopt 
a successful strategy for economic activity while at the same time 
accepting the reality that the outcomes of these interactions will not 
reflect the intentions of any particular actor. As a result we are able 
to understand the limits of effective purposive action by individuals. 
By thinking of Smith’s account as having both a macro and a micro 
level of advice we come to a better understanding of the operation 
of the invisible hand. This most Smithian of ideas is the operation of 
individuals acting prudently within the institutional framework of 
a market economy as outlined in the Wealth of Nations. 
 To conclude, as we saw above, Smith was no utopian about com‑
mercial society or the possibility of all of his views being enacted. 
But in the Wealth of Nations he saw himself as offering evidence that 
he saw as supporting economic development. In another context 
Smith argued that “What is prudence in the conduct of every pri‑
vate family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom” (Smith, 
1976a, p. 457). But one might have added that what is prudence in 
the conduct of every family will overcome the folly that might exist 
in a great kingdom.
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